Kalabagh Dam

Kalabagh is highly controversial dam. Its long controversy has destroyed the nation and prevented water resources development. It is the most haunted dam. It is ritually demanded without knowing its technical flaws.

It will be surprising to know that Kalabagh is NOT a flood control dam as it will be on run-of-the-river for 50 flood days according to its hydraulic design.

WAPDA has given a very wrong Terms of Reference to the Kalabagh Project Consultants. How can the client fix the design criteria before the preparation of feasibility report? How can it force its requirements on a site incapable of it? How can the client dictate technical instructions to the Consultants? As a result of wrong TOR, the consultants have pointed out some very serious flaws but WAPDA did not agree to the Consultants recommendations. The Consultants had to follow the tailored TOR as quoted below;

“Basically the design criteria were set during the initial appraisal of scheme and development out line design. These were based on the requirements of the client through the terms of reference or subsequent instructions”

Binni and Partners Project Consultants did not agree to the dictated hydraulic design of “Restricted mid-level sluicing hydraulic design” on the grounds, that silt will not be evacuated out of the reservoir and that there will be unacceptable backwater flow in Kabul River.

Contrary to this, the Consultants recommended “Unrestricted low-level sluicing hydraulic design” to allow floodwater to pass for 100 days instead of 50 days as instructed by WAPDA. Unfortunately, WAPDA did not agree to the Project Consultant’s recommendations.

The Consultants have pointed out that Kalabagh Dam’s foundation is weak, therefore a hydraulic structure more than 160 feet cannot be raised at the dam site. On the contrary, WAPDA instructed the Consultants to raise the structure to 260 feet to store 9.5 maf gross storage.

Dam structure is designed for earthquake of intensity of 7 on Rector scale but an earthquake of 8.4 intensity has already occurred.

Because of the restricted mid-level sluicing hydraulic design, the reservoir will almost be on run-of-the-river for about 4 monsoon months a year. Therefore, its power generation is restricted to 1450 MW. WAPDA therefore instructed the Consultants to provide 2000 MW of Thermal Power Plant attached to the dam to support its hydropower.

As Kalabagh Dam will be on run-of-the-river for about 4 monsoon months a year to allow floodwater to pass through, therefore Kalabagh is NOT a flood control dam.

Backwater flow and heading up upstream of the Attock gorge, will deposit silt upstream of the Gorge. This will further raise the bed of the Indus and will create havoc in Peshawar valley. Recent floods have practically demonstrated that Nowshera and other areas were almost submerged by floodwater. On GT road near Nowshera town about 12 to 14 feet depth of floodwater was flowing. The KBD Project Consultants have reported that floodwater elevation in 1929 was 941. In 1841, they have shown that floodwater level reached up to 1975. This year I estimate it may be about 970. Imagine what would have been the situation if there was 260 feet high Kalabagh Dam across the Indus. This would have raised the water surface level of the Indus to a very dangerous level. The valley upstream of the Attock gorge would be subjected to heavy silting that would cause sever backwater flow. The Consultants have indicated this fact in the Feasibility report. I quote few excerpts from the feasibility report as below;

“In principle there is no specific mode of operation that must be adhered to each year in order to sluice sediment from Kalabagh Reservoir but the lower the drawdown level, the lower this level is maintained and the higher the flows then the more effective the sluicing will be”.

The Consultants suggests unrestricted low-level sluicing as in a barrage. They virtually suggested a barrage but there is lack of understanding because of the wrong TOR. Few more excerpts are;

The high sediment load carried by the Indus at Kalabagh has an important bearing on the design of Kalabagh and on the operation rules for the reservoir. If a high proportion of sediment is trapped the storage volume would rapidly reduce with the loss of irrigation benefits derived from storage. Such sedimentation could eventually also cause unacceptable backwater effects”.

This excerpt shows the design has an important bearing on the dam to which WAPDA did not agree. The Consultant shows high sediment deposition will take place. They further show loss of storage due to rapid silting and loss of irrigation benefits. Moreover, they say it will cause sever backwater flow in Peshawar valley that would destroy it.

“Upstream of Attock gorge the flood level are sensitive to the amount of sediment so that flood vrisk will increase with time”. This excerpt show Kalabagh Dam is not a flood control dam.

“In the long run the generation of power will be on run-of-of-river”

This excerpt shows Kalabagh Dam is neither flood control nor irrigation dam but would only produce low power on run-of-the-river. This is the reason to install 2000 MW of Thermal power plant to the dam.

“No immediate solution for sediment management seems to be practically viable”.  

After the construction of Kalabagh Dam, the sub-soil flow in Peshawar valley will also stop and start heading up vertically to the surface, as the dam will block its horizontal sub-soil flow. This will cause rise in water table in the whole Peshawar valley.

The Kalabagh, Munda and Akhori dams said to be flood control are NOT flood control. The Ministry and WAPDA are unaware of the real flood control dams. I pointed out the multipurpose flood control dams at Katzarah and at Guroh Dop since 1962 in a Master Plan. I repeated the merits of these dams dozens of times but no body cared. The consequences of massive floods are now before the nation in the shape of billions of dollars losses. Most of the infrastructure is destroyed, about 3 crores population is affected, thousands of people are killed, thousands of villages are washed off, cities are damaged. It is estimated we have gone 50 year back. The flood is worse than 2004 tsunami as the UN said. It is far more devastating than the earthquake of 2005. It will be very difficult to recover. What to speak of building flood control dams, recovery will be hard to achieve. The Government must therefore think very seriously what to do. Flood mitigation dams must carefully be identified. Please read my reports and do what is right.

Excellent, feasible, noncontroversial, cheap Alternative to Kalabagh Dam

There is no doubt that highly publicized Kalabagh Dam is technically infeasible due to its TOR given to the Kalabagh Project Consultant besides being politically controversial. The Government is asking for creating consensus of politicians but I say it is NOT the question of consensus. It is purely a highly technical matter beyond the understanding of politicians. Better study the feasibility report prepared by the project consultants themselves. It is they, who have pointed out design flaws and it is the TOR that went wrong in dictating wrong design to the consultants to adopt.

In order to satisfy political ego and to locate safe project in this very vicinity, I suggest to build low–dam-cum-barrage on run-of the-Indus river about 5 miles upstream of Kalabagh Dam site. This structure will produce 2000 to 4500 MW of power, store about 2.5 maf of water to be repeatedly filled 2 to 4 times due to its unique location where about 90 maf water passes during the year. The storage reservoir would be confined to the Indus River valley. It therefore involves no land acquisition, no land compensation and no controversy. The high barrage storage will act as “balancing Reservoir” for Tarbela and Basha dams when more power generation is required and extra water is to be released. This extra water will be arrested for storage and not wasted to sea. The location of the newly proposed structure is about 4 to 5 miles upstream of the Kalabagh Dam site on the Indus. Kalabagh is located downstream of the confluence of the Indus River and Soan River.